By Bruna Costa

The Bible is filled with references to rulers and figures whose mythology is centered on the land of Israel. Among these stories is the Epic of the two lovers: Samson and Delilah. Samson was a Judge over Israel for twenty years after this story according to the Bible,[1] but the book does not give stories about his rule. The stories involving Samson are before his time as a Judge and he can be summed up as a biblical superhero with antics of violence and mayhem. There is little philosophy, but it is entertaining as it is also propaganda. The main antagonists of Samson are a group of ancient people known as the Philistines who ruled over the Hebrew population during the time of the story. Their acts were extremely abusive to the Hebrew population and the main sufferings of Samson at the hands of the Philistines are the loss of his first wife, hair, and eyes. Samson, according to the story, was able to seek revenge on the Philistines killing over 3000 civilians along with the priests of the city by toppling the main temple within which he was held prisoner. 3000 deaths resulted from his action; in a logical sense, this is more than what was worth his losses. Samson only lost his first wife, eyes, and hair which are incomparable to more than 3000 innocent people losing their lives. However, the reader of the story will be happy Samson won in the end and disregard the deaths of the Philistines.

This story was written for the Hebrews of Israel in order to provide some form of justification due to their suffering at the hands of the Philistines. The myth can therefore be classified as propaganda due to it being made for the populace in support of the Judge, Samson. This early piece of propaganda dehumanizes the Philistines and allows for their slaughter to not have the weight it would have if it were a slaughter of Hebrews. This also allows for the Hebrews to be free of any guilt for the Philistine slaughter because the piece brings forth a cause for justification. To audiences outside of the Hebrew people, the myth can stand as a testament of the people of Israel’s good standing with their God and so it can serve also as a warning. Most early propaganda pieces dehumanize an enemy of a nation or of the author in order to the show the enemy as inferior.

The USSR during their existence before World War II and during the conflict had their propaganda used as an intellectual tool to acknowledge the best of the nation and its leaders for those living within the new superpower while using the same tactics to show superiority to audiences of other nations. The populations outside of the borders had been subject to intellectual arguments and propaganda for the superiority of the USSR and Marxism. In order to set a stage for war torn populations to seek refuge in communism and the USSR following WWII, Soviet propaganda was meant to spark a future communist revolution led by the masses based off of Soviet example.

Before WWII directly affected the USSR, Soviets were concerned with proper appeasement of the newly installed Marxist regime after the October Revolution in 1917. After the communist forces seized power, most attention to life was to be measured in labor which was embodied by the communal strength of the many proletariats. This image of communal living was ideal for the regime; however, the truth behind the philosophy of the new regime was rather incredibly polarizing of the masses. People were socially and mentally divided amongst one another by jobs, sex, religion, and other labels which are even apparent today.[2] Soviet citizens ranged from various states of economic disparity and wealth often creating cultural symbols of wealth such as suits which would mentally divide the populace.[3] This led to physical conflicts among the people due to the hypocrisy of these privileged people living in a Marxist society. They were small conflicts, but there were numerous ones enough to cause concern for officials of the USSR due to the conflicts taking on anti-regime rhetoric. “By 23 (of) September a report noted that: the general political and moral condition of the population is healthy. However, there are unhealthy and sometimes directly anti-Soviet feelings bordering on counter-revolutionary conversations.[4]”

Propaganda in order to solidify the nation as one was a main tactic undertaken by the Soviet administration. The main objectives of the first phase were to focus propaganda onto the masses by instilling what it meant to be a Russian and a Soviet. The first propaganda tactic used was researching history to glorify a culturally distinct Russian past whether it was able to be glorified. Authors, such as Leo Tolstoy, had their work glorified as an intellectual achievement to highlight the far superior nature of Soviets.[5] This only worked for a small fragment of the population however; many citizens were unfortunately illiterate before the revolution (which soon changed with a more politically conscious working class and education system) and those who couldn’t read only went on rumors of these literary masters. According to David Brandenberger, the next method of uniting the people under history was to emphasize ancient Russian patriots and heroes. “Vast stretches of the empire’s Russian-speaking population simply could not imagine a larger political community than what was defined by their provincial economic, cultural, and kinship association… In part, what seems to have been lacking among most Russians under the old regime was a commonly-held awareness of a long, glorious history, replete with a pantheon of semi-mythical patriots whose heroism had advanced the national cause.[6]”

Art meant to be absorbed by the Soviet people during the war period was a means of promoting a social order of the USSR. For the proletariat, it showed them as part of the past and a more meaningful contributor to USSR society. Propaganda before WWII was mostly done with the format of the poster which was used thoroughly by the Soviet government. They were often held in vacant shop windows to promote the ideals a proletariat should live by, including finding joy in one’s work for the glory of the USSR. Art styles went along with a mix of the Russian folk style Lubok and modern art.[7] Such print art eventually evolved to serve the state in this purpose. The philosophy of Marxism pushed the USSR to pressure artists to work with more than just their wills for expression. The artists had to work for the state and produce a product to cultivate a mindset modeling a Soviet citizen. The development of the art style Socialist Realism gave the ability for propagandistic material to flourish in the mid-1930s and force the avant-garde artist into obscurity.[8]

This use of art forced the individual artists to create criticisms in a manner not benefitting the government or Stalin. Art students of the time period were some of the common dissenters and critics of the new regime whose plight lay in the arts the regime presented. One such critical view of the new direction art was forced to take was crafted by V.I. Blium who said, “Soviet patriotism nowadays is sometimes coming to resemble racist nationalism.[9]” However, the way such public criticisms were dealt with in the USSR was usually imprisonment or worse. For example, according to a firsthand account from a citizen of the German occupied city of Smolensk, “(a group of students) discussed various controversial problems...they were accused of anti-soviet agitation and propaganda. There was a show trial at the institute, and they were sentenced. They sat a long time in the Smolensk prison.[10]” The criticisms of the USSR were not just directed at the state itself, but to the man who embodied the state and the philosophy of Marxism.

The man who headed this nation and most operations concerning the war and propaganda was the greatest symbol of nationalism the USSR possessed; Joseph Stalin. Born December 21, 1879, he took up revolutionary activities that were considered illegal in the time of the Romanovs. Studying Marxism and working with the first leader of the USSR Vladimir Lenin, he amassed glorification campaigns for communism and led the revolution against the Romanovs. He single handedly fought battles, led the nation in times of strife, and without him the USSR would surely be lost![11] This summary is the rhetoric of numerous books about the leader within this time period of his rule, and was meant to be absorbed by the Soviet people which helped to make his image comparable to a venerated saint.

The truth of Stalin is neither bad nor good holistically but rather bad or good at times with such judgement dependent on the viewpoint of the observer and the topic at hand. He did lead most propaganda efforts with emphasis on Russia’s past emphasized on the exploitations of workers throughout time. Part of amassing his image as a savior was to have documents and photos doctored as an attempt to obscure history to his favor. He was pictured as a single soldier on the front lines fighting an army when in reality, he was leading his army to fight another with Stalin behind a war desk.[12].

In 1928, Stalin was concerned with the economic and military strength of his nation, a concern he used to accomplish his massive utilization of industrialization. The main reasons for this were possibly to secure grain, land access, disciplining the peasantry to the collectivist ways of the communist regime, and even to discipline those within his party.[13] In regards to his relations with foreign leaders such as Hitler, he was concerned more with their policies toward his nation. His joining in the League of Nations exemplifies this concern because, while he could plot the immediate destruction of world leaders, he was more concerned with creating a communal image of the seemingly successful USSR for world leaders to be spectators to and potentially study.[14] After the war, his intentions for this became clear, “…the defeat of the Germans (in WWII) by the Russians would be followed by the victory of communism throughout Europe.[15]”

This mission, while propaganda might make it seem that Stalin could accomplish it on his own, was not accomplishable without the assured help of his nation. This help would be the support of the populace, and just to have a strong history of the country filled with intellectual and previous war glories would not be enough. He had to win their souls like a god. Stalin would have to be venerable material and so a cult-like atmosphere slowly formed around the leader which came to an apex in 1929. According to author Moshe Lewin, Stalin had become the system and therefore the embodiment of the USSR, if not Russia and Marxism. Stalin had to keep himself at a distance from his political party and other major bodies of people that had the opportunity to create controversy among the population and made drastic changes with his government officials in order to demonstrate his unique charisma. One such bold move was that Stalin had purged his generals and offered new ones in their place to demonstrate and collect his power. His power further took on the embodiment of war efforts by often finding ways of eliminating internal threats.[16] He would appear innocent and regretful when suspected internal opposition was eliminated which lead to rumors of his deadly orchestration efforts.[17] One of the main methods of cult spreading was the use of controlling the news in the newspaper Pravda which specialized in news stories glorifying Stalin to be absorbed within the nation. Focusing on the literal image of Stalin, the magazine centralized his veneration and was even spread outside of Russia.[18] In fact, the cult spread so well that people thought the leader was humble and stood as the example of the perfect man not only to Soviets but to people abroad. Writer and exile Lion Feuchtwanger noted, “(Stalin) shrugs his shoulders at the vulgarity of the immoderate worship of his person.[19]”

The philosophy of Marxism became a major criticism of the existence of Stalin’s cult. As stated by historian Sarah Davies, the cult worked very well to broadcast Stalin as a great leader, but the background of Stalin did not match what was desired for a Marxist nation and his citizens began to take notice. He was a privileged intellectual; a man of great merit according to the cult, but he was not a proletariat. “Leaders were perceived as non-proletarian: ‘Our leaders are not from the workers; Stalin is from an artisanal family[20].’” He became a different kind of worker, one who worked for the state through actions of what he perceived to be what would be best for the USSR. One of these actions taken was signing the non-aggression pact with Germany.

The Warsaw Pact (also called the Non-Aggression Pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact), signed August 23, 1939, was meant to be a peace agreement between Germany and the USSR. As it may be ascertained when looking back at history; this pact meant to serve as merely protectionary, but both sides may have had other intentions. The USSR experienced public fallout due to the perceived alliance made by Stalin with the fascist Germans. One such reaction noted by Davies was by a factory worker who said, “’…one oughtn’t to overestimate the peace-loving intentions of the Germans'; 'We ought not have concluded a treaty with Germany because Germany will break it anyway.[21]’” Another reason for the fallout was that the USSR was seen as rescinding their supposed superiority over other nations for agreeing to a pact with a perceived inferior nation which was antithetical due to the massive amount of nationalistic propaganda present within the regime. It is known that the protected Baltic States were to serve as military buffers against the fascists during the Warsaw Pact time period,[22] but they also may have served as a testing ground for the propaganda Soviets planned to give to the rest of Europe following the war. Through private speeches made by USSR officials such as Andrei Zhdanov during the pact period, it was clear the USSR outlined such a plan of attack. “(Soviet theorist) E.S. Varga… just after the pact had been signed, had predicted the identical future course of World War II—a few months later similarly foretold by Molotov and Zhdanov –culminating in immense social revolution in the warring states.[23]”

As seen by the actions taken by the USSR between 1939 and 1941 and a large emphasis on the spread of Soviet nationalism accompanied by Marxism, the industrial nation seemed to prepare for another course of action that did not come to fruition. A planned Marxist take over after 1945 combining both military and intellectual powers of war-torn Europe was taking place. Recall back to Soviet propaganda aimed at Russians proposing the intellectual superiority backed up by the Russian past; while the intellectuals seemed to hold Russia in a light of prosperity, an acknowledgement of intellectuals outside of the USSR borders was more along the lines of demeaning their intellectual merits by showing off the flaws of their homelands. The key in this line of propaganda to be absorbed within the USSR was the people’s dedication to the intellectual masters of their soil. With a Russian populace tested and trained for what propaganda was effective, the next stages of this plan would be the use of propaganda on those outside of Soviet borders. A look into the history of Europe however would show such intellectual spreads of nationalist pride as common among the neighboring governments.

The propaganda spreading outside of the USSR portion of Stalin’s plan may have been indirectly set in motion before he took power. The perceived capitalist failings of Europe were often widely criticized as de-humanizing and turning a once proud and productive populace of Europeans into colloquial “Philistines.” In regard to warfare and chemical weapons, Europeans were criticized during the World War One period as people not caring about the detrimental effects of the weapons but were more concerned with where they will access their love of gluttony and repression of their old insecurities. Russia, in an intellectual sense, acted in the past like a bald man who knew of his baldness while the rest of Europe acted like a man with long hair to hide the fact he was bald as well. “Ask the common man what he would like and he will say, ‘little to do, little to think, but lots to eat.’” This notion of the European simpleton in Russian intellectual history shows the belief that the European “future war” will be one for which they do not comprehend the lasting effects.[24]

The European emphasis on militarization due to their reliance on capitalism in WWI was destructive by the Soviets. Seen ignorant for their wants and concerns for materials they themselves destroyed with the last great war, Soviets believed another one would not solve the issues present in Europe and throughout the Western world. The USSR saw itself as a great intellectual force driven by communism and saw itself as the savior Europe needed. The rest of the world was driven by consumption and in order to save it, the world would have to copy the superiority of the USSR. If the enemy does not surrender however, it must be destroyed.[25]

In Marxism, a social revolution would be the only way for a nation to change from one system of production to another. This often implies a violent struggle originated by the masses (hence popular terms such as “the people’s revolution” as connected with communists) towards a ruling body of oppression. This is best exemplified by the October Revolution which rid Russia of the Romanovs and put Lenin, and later Stalin, in power. The revolution would only happen however when the people are influenced by such a will to fight against the ruling power that be; it cannot be a revolution forced onto the people by a military power. The major way this would happen for the benefit of the USSR would be through propaganda to shift the will of the masses outside of their own borders. To give the outside world a picture of what could be a Marxist utopia, the Soviets crafted their propaganda to fit the picture. As noted by Arnold Perris, “By the 1930s the Soviet leaders realized that their world revolution had not occurred. Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States had not collapsed…The USSR planners now turned inward to nurture their Communist movement and protect it from the rest of the world. The glory of old Russia was resurrected, and the Czarist period…now stimulated dozens of stories, films, and vocal and instrumental music.[26]”

In the US, most propaganda during the war was racist and meant to inspire violent reaction towards certain groups of people, particularly German and Japanese people, regardless of individual affiliation to the wartime enemies. Propaganda was also used in the US for purposes of nationalism and promotion of civil programs such as service registration. Soviet propaganda did not follow so much in the direction of the US. Soviet propaganda. It was one which took a sympathetic route which made the populace of former enemy nations a people to be saved, and demonized the failed philosophies of former nations’ leadership. Propagandists made use of various art mediums such as plays, literature, music, posters, and films which served 3 major themes. The first was to demonize fascism and show through world leaders who supported fascism that it was a system determined to fail the people. The second was to promote the Russian proletariat with a glorious past and a reason to fight not only for the sake of promoting Marxism but to support the Soviet way of life. The third was to show the USSR as a nation of sanctuary to a war-torn world.

In plays, propaganda had a main effect in promotion of a proper Soviet citizen during the time of WWII. Most plays echoed the cries from the battlefront in order to connect the masses to the cause. These are stories of war bravado, human experience, and some are even comical but in the Russian way, so it is a darker form of comedy. Nevertheless, these plays were efficient in providing the populace with an image of the warfront and how to behave on such a front for those who had loved ones already fighting. Plays such as “Ivan the Terrible” by A.N. Tolstoy held a strong image of the Tsar’s past in terms of military might as it was deemed appropriate by the Bolsheviks. This approval took the form of a nomination of the Stalin Prize Committee prize in 1941. However, the image of the Tsar was distorted and subsequently lost the prize.[27] Plays were also re-written by directors to better serve the USSR in terms of glorifying the Russian individual. One opera titled “A Life for the Tsar” was re-written to allow for the central glory from the audience to be diverted from the Tsar (portrayed as sickly and wretched) to the peasant (portrayed as honorable and heroic). The chorus was re-written not to glorify the tsar but to glorify the Russian.[28]

While the plays only served to benefit those who could go to the theatre, writings proved to be just as effective but to a wider audience due to accessibility and proven by consumption. During wartime, a “proper” soldier carried traditions enforced by propagandistic literature. One such tradition was a blue kerchief and the tradition was emphasized by a piece of poetry titled Blue Kerchief. The piece of cloth was a connection worn by those serving and those with whom they had a connection for: mothers, lovers, and sisters, and all were likely to wear the cloth when their male counterparts served. Another piece of poetry is Vasily Lebedev-Kumach and Aleksandr Aleksandrov’s Holy War which emphasizes the Great Patriotic War to be equitable to past wars of religion. Only this time, religion, which was regarded as the opiate of the masses, was replaced by duty to the Stalin regime. To culminate this nationalistic theme came a more personal touch which embodied a national symbol; a hanged woman displayed as a symbol of fascist brutality by the name of Tanya. Tanya was useful to show the brutality of the fascists’ forces which had invaded the USSR. She became the face of what Russia was a victim of, for what kind of brute would hang an innocent Russian girl? Further, what ideology forced humans to act so inhumanely?[29]

The ideology would be Fascism, an ideology continually embodied by the German Nazis and vilified within Soviet propaganda. One of the most effective forms of vilification of the Nazis occurred in the print and film industry of Russia. After being invaded by the Germans, the home front was littered with propaganda reenacting the situation and tying it back to events of the country’s past. For instance, a print in the classical Lubok where Napoleon is being driven out by Russian forces looks identical with a substitution for Hitler and a gun in place of a spear to drive him out. These are mainly due to the rushed efforts of soviet artists as the invasion which, while not a surprise to Stalin, was unprecedented and provided a strain of resources on artists. After the initial invasion, the wartime posters took on more of an anti-fascist tone to provide the people a reason to fight for the USSR. This includes reproduced images of Tanya and children dying at the Nazi hands. As they took on more nationalistic approaches to promote reasons to fight the Germans, the common poster would include slogans such as, “death to child killers.[30]”Another poster displayed a phrase, “One good turn deserves another” and implies a Russian peasant could defeat a Nazi official. This is reminiscent of a poster from 1812 where the same thing occurs with a Napoleonic officer.[31]

The method of tying in social issues with the past is what truly defined propaganda during the war era, but so did resilience of the Soviet citizen to the fires of war. Various photos of Stalin and of the USSR society were staged during this era to advertise the nation as strong for the soviets. When other leaders were apparently tied up with war efforts often defined by the stress that came with their position, Stalin was shown as a brave and god-like (mainly due to an abundance of images of him in white suits which are perceived in the Western world as positive) figure not deviating from activities which brought him happiness. In one staged photo example, Stalin is shown in a white suit among friends within his park. However, the communist is not relaxing but rather conducting work for the families of Soviets that are depicted alongside him as they relax. Their leader is working happily while the rest of the USSR should do the same during wartime.[32] Other photo sets come from the Soviet press which shows like a photo journal the rest of the USSR during wartime. These photos include the normal life still in motion even with fascist fires raging on the western front. The message behind photos like these is simple; keep on working for the good of the USSR. With these photos, citizens were able to conduct themselves in a manner which matches both Marxism and their duties. The citizens were shown how the most they could do both on and off the war front was to serve the state so that it would not crumble.[33]

In film, this same message carried quite well for Soviet audiences and still held up to a message of not only nationalism to audiences abroad but also of warning to their governments. Due to the ease and ability to understand film, it was one of the widest accessed forms of entertainment. Compared to other mediums, this form of propaganda also was unique in that it spread well beyond the Soviet borders. On the home front though came a change of direction for films concerning themselves with the common person. People often died in full view of people when they were struck down by the Nazis and the roles of women and children were emphasized in ways so they could help the men abroad.[34]

In order to emphasize the glories of the past to strengthen the mission of nationalism and to support the fight against the Nazis, there were two directions taken by film directors to bring the pro-USSR messages at home and abroad. The first was to film the recent past to highlight the October Revolution and the tyranny of the Romanovs. The glories of Lenin and Stalin in these films would show who the people were led by and allowed for an image to stay within history.[35] In the German occupied Soviet city of Smolensk, this proved to be most effective and proved film to be a great means of propaganda to audiences. The theatre would show these propaganda pieces to the people of Smolensk and the films acted not only as entertainment but also as escapist pieces. Psychologically speaking, this allowed for the revolutions of Russia and the comforts of the theatre to embed themselves both as saviors from the reality of WWII for the individuals of Smolensk.[36]

The second direction for film to go to was to focus on ancient Russian history and nowhere is the at-home and abroad propagandist materials more apparent than with the film Alexandr Nevskii. Directed by S.M. Einstein, the film chronicles the history of the prince in his exploits and battles. The direction by Einstein was to stimulate USSR patriotism for the war effort by emphasizing the idea that Russia was a land familiar with war struggles that presented themselves outside their borders during the film’s release. The film was extraordinary though not a truly accurate take on the history of the pre-Tsarist era. The film was released in 1938, one year before the signing of the non-aggression pact. What is interesting to note about the timing of the release was the film’s final message served as a warning to the nations practicing military pride before WWII erupted in Africa and later then Europe. The final scene follows a battle won by the prince with a final word of caution to the world, “Whosoever comes to us with the sword shall perish by the sword.[37]”

These pieces of propaganda served their purpose to protect the interests of the USSR which were: nationalism in terms of intellectual superiority due to Marxism, keeping the populace supportive of Stalin and his visions for the USSR, and to begin a step forward to spread Marxism throughout a war torn Europe. The propaganda efforts are impossible to calculate after the war; though the populace which absorbed the propaganda held onto the state’s myths and it is undeniable the propaganda fed the fires of nationalism during the war. One theme of propaganda, which sheds light on its effectiveness, is the government sponsored movements against certain sects of citizens: the religious and particularly the Jewish populations.

In the USSR, religions were the opiate of the masses and illogical in the name of science. Antitheist (a malicious belief against religion) campaigns spread across the nation representing this theme and dividing the populace between religious and non-religious. While there were some people who held onto religion, they kept it in secret due to the public violence occurring across the country. Church bells were destroyed, and some melted down, degrading messages painted onto walls about religion were common, and even antitheist leagues were established to essentially hunt down public theists.[38] The Jews became targets of a special caliber in this age. The Soviet people’s attitude towards the Jews was intensely negative and grew more so due to propagandized fears that the Israelites’ goals are not communistic. They feared a “community of Israel” existed to help the non-working Jews during the pre-war period of the early 1920s. Religious welfare activities were held in disfavor by the new communist government even though, prior to the existence of the USSR, some committee members were theists if not Jewish. The people believed the communist parties to be against their religion and felt neither the Jewish socialist party nor the main government were safe havens for the people.[39] Youth leagues demanded the closure of synagogues as their presence had potential to destroy a collectivist Marxist vision. The government relief for the Jewish populace was not enough for the crimes Jews were victims of. The populace ultimately grew violent towards the religious order and the propaganda artists continually took on more of an offensive tone. One such example was a poster depicting a Jew during Yom Kippur mimicking the greed and European ways of a capitalist which were inferior to the Marxist USSR.[40]

A small sample can be taken from Smolensk during the German occupation of how the psychological effects of propaganda on Soviets in Smolensk twisted people’s interpretations of Jews, Russians, and Germans. The Jews were seen as an uneasy lot by the Soviets and the citizens claimed to be numb to the Jews existence while some were terrified. The Germans were perceived as the uneducated brutish occupiers whose power only came from physical force and machinery. This allowed for the Soviets to create secret groups within the town based around the ideology of mental superiority over the fascists. The Soviets perceived their only weakness was lack of ability even though their will power was apparently strengthened by the anti-fascist propaganda produced for them. Most of the propaganda was not seen to incarnate Jewish strength and, to the Russians, the Jew was dehumanized.[41]

The propaganda of the USSR was a means of promoting Marxism as a great savior for the world due mainly to propagandized success of the USSR and the leadership of Stalin. The anti-fascist and ultimately anti-western messages they promoted brought the first steps for a USSR intellectual revolution in the name of Marxism to the people outside the USSR borders. During WWII, propaganda in artistic and entertainment imbued within the Soviet citizen a will to fight for the USSR against the fascists. Ultimately however, as history shows, this did not occur and the capitalism so despised by the regime has yet to fade. During the war however the propaganda helped the citizens of the USSR go through a time of strife and build up the egos of the people fighting and contributing to keeping the home at peace during the war. Where Samson destroyed the Philistines in his myth, the propagandized myths of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War were to save the European philistines from the perceived brutish capitalists threatening human life. The propaganda did also allow for the possibility of these proposed Philistines to become re-educated and turned for the superior Marxist USSR.

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[1] Judges, 16:31

[2] Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 124.

[3] Laurie R. Cohen, Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in occupied Russia (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 36.

[4] Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[5] David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 17-19.

[6] David Brandenberger, “Stalin’s populism and the accidental creation of Russian national identity” (Nationalities Papers, Sep. 2010, Vol. 30 Issue 5. Accessed 2/18/2015), 2.

[7] Alla Rosenfeld, Defining Russian Graphic Arts: From Diaghilev to Stalin, 1898-1934 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 132-139.

[8] Alla Rosenfeld, Defining Russian Graphic Arts: From Diaghilev to Stalin, 1898-1934 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 2.

[9] David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 5.

[10] Laurie R. Cohen, Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in occupied Russia (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 40.

[11] G.F. Alexandrov, Et al, Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), 5-180.

[12] Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 113.

[13] Graham Stephenson, Russia from 1812 to 1945: A History (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), 362.

[14]Graham Stephenson, Russia from 1812 to 1945: A History (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), 406.

[15]Graham Stephenson, Russia from 1812 to 1945: A History (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), 408.

[16]Moshe Lewin, Russia/ USSR/ Russia: The Drive and Drift of a Superstate (New York: The New Press, 1995), 223-226.

[17]Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 113.

[18]Jan Plamper, The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power (New York: Yale University Press, 2012), 29.

[19]Jan Plamper, The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power (New York: Yale University Press, 2012), 121.

[20]Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 124.

[21]Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 98.

[22] R.C. Raack, “Did Stalin plan a Drang nach Western?” (World Affairs. Summer92, Vol. 155 Issue 1).

[23]R.C. Raack, “Did Stalin plan a Drang nach Western?” (World Affairs. Summer92, Vol. 155 Issue 1).

[24]Maxim Gorky, Culture and the People, (New York: Books for Libraries, 1939), 48-50.

[25] Maxim Gorky, Culture and the People,( New York: Books for Libraries, 1939), 50-55.

[26] Arnold Perris, Music as Propaganda: Art to Persuade, Art to Control, (Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 1985), 75.

[27] David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 164, 181.

[28] David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 262-263.

[29] Ed. James Von Geldern, Richard Stites, Mass Culture in Soviet Russia, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 333-341.

[30] Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives, (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 133.

[31]Stephen M. Norris, War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and National Identity, 1812-1945, (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 179-182.

[32] Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives, (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 111.

[33] Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives, (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 101-127

[34]Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1998), 53, 56.

[35] Rosa Ferre, Red Cavalry: Creation and Power in Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1945, (Madrid; La Casa Enciendida, 2011), 519-523.

[36] Laurie R. Cohen, Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in occupied Russia, (New York: University of Rochester Press , 2013), 173-175.

[37] David Brandenberger, Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 233-242.

[38] Peter Radetsky, The Soviet Image: A Hundred Years of Photographs from Inside the TASS Archives, (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007), 108-109.

[39] Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 238-240.

[40]Anna Shternshis, Soviet and Kosher: Jewish Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 3-25.

[41] Laurie R. Cohen, Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in occupied Russia, (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 203-207.